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Abstract
Noise-induced pollution constitutes a hot and topical societal problem for 
all major airports. This paper discusses various issues in the implementation of a 
market for noise licenses as a solution to solve the noise externality between the 
residents located around airports and the aircrafts moving in and to airports.
Résumé
La gestion de la pollution sonore autour des aéroports est un problème 
important. Un marché de permit de bruit pourrait solutionner le problème 
d’externalité entre résidents et avions en mouvement autour d’un aéroport. Cet 
article discute la mise en oeuvre d’un tel instrument.
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I. Introduction
Noise pollution around airport is probably one of the most salient 
environmental and societal issues in large cities. Because of the 
variety of stakes, noise pollution constitutes a crucial management 
and political problem for urban and regional policy makers. Regarding 
airport authorities, the main problem is to cope with local residents’ 
resistance. Regarding the public authority, the problem is to implement 
a fair and efficient regulation of aircraft activity around the airport. 
At the implementation level, a key issue is the spreading of aircraft 
movements over different geographical zones (the choice of routes). 
However, the implementation of any solution must first solve of the 
problem created by the absence of residents’ revealed preferences about 
noise pollution.
In practice, current noise regulations use command-and-control 
instruments. Local governments negotiate with airport authorities 
about the aircraft movement activity and the geographical design of 
the aircraft routes. However, such regulations are usually disconnected 
from local residents’ subjective perception of noise damages. Many 
discussions have focused on technological improvements or on the 
definition of noise standards. For instance, governments have exerted 
pressures for airports to operate quieter airplanes and adopt less 
noisy land-off and kick-off procedures. Recent history has clearly 
shown that much improvement can be achieved thanks to such 
technological improvements. Other policies have limited the amount 
of noise around airport by setting noise quotas. In such policies, the 
airport is allocated a number of noise quotas that it grants, or possibly, 
auctions to airline companies. In most cases, the number of quotas 
fixed by local governments usually attempts to set the noise damage 
to its historical level. Surprisingly, none of those policies are able or 
designed to set the level of noise damage to what would coincide with 
a socially optimal level, neither for the global activity level, nor for the 
distribution of noise around the airport. This is merely due to the fact 
that those policies do not rely on an evaluation of residents’ actual noise 
disutility. In other words, given the absence of information about noise 
disutility, one cannot judge whether the above technological efforts are 
insufficient or excessive, whether airport activity is above or below its 
socially optimal level, whether aircraft movements produce too much 
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noise or not, and finally whether the noise level is acceptable or not by 
residents.
In this paper we present a novel policy instrument for noise regulation 
around airports. It simply consists in giving the right for silence to 
the residents located around the airport, and allowing them to sell 
the related tradable noise licenses to airlines companies. By doing 
so, residents reveal their preferences (i.e. their disutility due to noise 
pollution) and the market for noise licenses, when adequately designed 
by the regulator, implements an efficient flight activity and spreading 
over the routes. Furthermore, because the rights are given to residents, 
local acceptability is also met. Finally, the market provides the airline 
companies with an incentive to adopt quieter aircrafts. 
Such a solution consists in defining property rights on quietness and 
allocating them to residents. Coase (1960) has clarified the role and 
limitations of property rights in the efficiency of economic situations 
between several economic agents. Montgomery (1972) has further 
explained how a market for pollution licenses can achieve efficiency. 
Since then, such instruments have been implemented in various 
environmental contexts. The present solution for airport noise is a 
natural extension of those views. In addition, the allocation of quietness 
rights to residents has strong similarities with the allocation of land 
property rights to landowners. The social acceptability of the former 
and latter might be similar.
The purpose of this paper is to explain how such market can work from 
a micro-economic viewpoint. The paper presents a rather simplified 
analysis for readers acquainted with usual economic notions. The 
general and more technical analysis is presented in Bréchet and Picard 
(2010) and practical implementation issues are analyzed in detail in 
Bréchet and Picard (2011). Our aim is not only to outline the properties 
of a well-designed market that solves the noise externality issues around 
airport, but it is also to point out that an efficient solution for airport 
noise should take the resident’s subjective damage into consideration. 
Any discussion in that direction is welcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly summarizes the 
economic literature on the topic. Section III explains how markets for 
noise licenses work. Section IV concludes.
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II. Economic context and related literature
Our approach departs from the institutional approach of noise 
management. In 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Assembly endorsed the concept of a « balanced approach », 
to aircraft noise management. It promotes the four policy approaches: 
(i) reduction at source (quieter aircraft), (ii) land-use planning and 
management, (iii) noise abatement operational procedures and (iv) 
operating restrictions. This ICAI’s declared objective is to address the 
noise problem in the most cost-effective manner. Nevertheless, it does 
not really refer to the residents’ damage. The European Commission 
also advocates a similar « balanced approach », to aircraft noise 
management (Directive 2002/30/EC, European Commission, 2002). Its 
objectives are however broader than those of ICAO as the Commission 
seeks to limit or reduce the number of people significantly affected by 
the harmful effects of noise, and to achieve maximum environmental 
benefit in the most cost-effective manner. The cost-effectiveness of the 
policy is clearly claimed, but the residents’ damage minimization is also 
part of its objective. Yet, the choice of the instrument to implement the 
policy remains open.
The residents located around an airport incur a considerable damage 
from the noise created by aircraft movements. Such damage may have 
an impact on the residents’ willingness to pay to locate, and therefore 
on house prices, in the noisy airport environments. The economic 
literature offers many evaluations of the impact of airport activities on 
property values in residential areas using hedonic prices models (see 
e.g. McMillen, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Schipper, 2004). The medium 
value of environmental costs in a set of 35 European airport areas is 
$0.0241 (0.0201 Euro) per passenger-km. In this figure, the noise costs 
counts for 75 per cent (Schipper, 2004). Roughly speaking, this implies 
an environmental cost of $2,400 (2,000 Euros) per 100-seat aircraft 
flight over 1,000 km. Numerous empirical studies have confirmed 
that aircraft noise influences property values around airports. Hedonic 
price approaches uses housing market data to infer the noise impact 
on housing rents. In average, they report a noise impact on housing 
rents of 1 per cent per acoustic decibel (e.g. Baranzini and Ramirez, 
2005). Interestingly, such measure does not significantly change with 
noise measuring procedures and with the institutional structure of the 
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housing market (private versus government ownership). According 
to this information, the price of a house would diminish by 15% if it 
is located in a noisy airport environment that increases the average 
decibel (dBA) by 15% compared to quiet locations. A recent study by 
Bréchet et al. (2009) confirms such values in the case of the Brussels’ 
airport. In addition, this study highlights the fact that the noise damage 
is highly unequally shared among the residents. It shows that a strong 
perceived damage (equivalent to a house rent discount of 1,200 Euros 
per year) is concentrated in a small residential place close to the airport. 
By contrast, a small perceived damage (equivalent to 220 Euros per 
year) is spread over a much larger set of residential locations.
Local economic benefits of airports are also significant, covering profit, 
tax revenues and direct and indirect employment opportunities. In the 
case of the last Chicago O’Hare airport extension, McMillen (2004) has 
assessed that the benefits outweighed the social costs (including noise 
damage). The issue of airport expansion is particularly tricky because 
it takes place in suburban areas. The opening of new runways typically 
exacerbates the dilemma between noise concern and economic benefits. 
According to the US Federal Aviation Administration, 18 of the 31 
large hub airports in the US plan to add runways in the next decade. 
Brueckner (2003) estimates that the O’Hare expansion would raise 
service related employment in the Chicago area by 185,000 jobs. In the 
case of Brussels’ airport, one may remember the information campaigns 
about job implications of airport extension and/or DHL relocation. Of 
course, the inclusion of job opportunities in the welfare gains of an 
airport extension depends on how such jobs substitutes for other jobs 
that are not related to the airport. For instance, such job opportunities 
would add nothing to the wealth of a region in a hypothetical world 
with full employment, perfect labor market and elastic labor demands. 
The welfare valuation of the related jobs can only be made by taking 
into account the existing imperfections in the labor market.
There exists nevertheless a strong presumption that the socio-economic 
benefits of the airport exceed its costs. Indeed, Brian and David Pearce, 
researchers at the University College of London, estimated that a very 
low tax (less than 2%) on air fares would suffice to compensate for 
the whole set of environmental effects (noise pollution, air pollution, 
etc.) caused by activity at Heathrow Airport. A back-to-the-envelop 
calculation shows that, in 2004, a tax of 12.5 Euros per passenger would 
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yield a revenue equivalent to the rental cost of the whole residential 
area under one of the two air corridors used by Brussels National before 
1999 (Picard, 2005). Bréchet et al. (2009) are more precise about the 
costs and benefits for Brussels’ airport. In that study, the social damage 
of aircraft noise is evaluated at about 10 million Euros in 2005, which 
can be compared with the revenues and profits generated by the airport: 
324 and 161 million Euros, respectively. The revenues and benefits of 
indirect activities should be added. A main question is then to assess 
by how much residents should be compensated to make aircraft noise 
acceptable. A cost and benefit analysis would help answering this 
question, but it would not address the problem of internalization of the 
noise externality between aircrafts, airports and residents.
The idea of tradeable licenses is not new3. Tradeable licenses have 
been promoted as policy instruments for environmental issues since 
Dales (1968). Initially, they were regarded as impractical despite 
their theoretically attractive properties (cost-efficiency). Yet, since the 
1990s, markets for tradeable licenses have been implemented for sulfur 
dioxide pollutants in the US power industry, and for carbon dioxide 
in the EU. Those market experiences where inspired by Montgomery 
(1972) who formally showed that, under a global emission constraint, 
competitive markets of tradeable licenses yield cost efficient allocations 
of pollution abatement whatever the distribution of licenses amongst 
polluters. In such a market, the global emission cap coincides with the 
total number of emission licenses, those being emitted by the regulator 
(grandfathered or auctioned) and trade occurring among polluters.
The environmental economic literature generally discusses the 
efficiency properties of the allocation of pollution licenses in a 
secondary market where a government has no information about the 
firms’ cost structure. Designing rules for initial allocations of pollution 
licenses (or quotas) has remained a critical issue of information 
revelation until the particular auction mechanism recently proposed by 
Montero (2007). However, such mechanisms cannot be applied to our 
context because the government has no information about individual’s 
noise damage function, and no information about each airline company’ 
business structure. By contrast, we here explain the design of a primary 
local market for noise licenses between the local victims (the residents) 
and the polluters (the aircraft companies). We give a particular focus 
on a design that makes the airport activity acceptable to neighboring 
3. We use the word «  license  », but «  permits  » or «  quotas  » can be found in the 
literature. In all cases, one permit gives the right to the polluter to emit one unit of 
pollution.
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residents. Since the latter are victims of aircraft noise disturbances, 
it seems natural to grant the property rights on noise (or quietness) 
to those residents. They are then free to sell those rights to aircraft 
companies by the means of noise licenses. Hence, the regulator does 
not impose any arbitrary global noise quota.
In this paper, our aim is to provide a contribution that is both 
policy-oriented and methodological. We propose a new application of 
the concept of tradeable licenses to the issue of noise exposure, with an 
emphasis on the spatial dimension of the problem.
III. The micro-economics of a market for noise licenses
The starting point of the discussion about airport noise licenses 
lies in several observations about residents, airlines and airport spatial 
structure. First, residents incur a disutility from aircraft noise that 
positively affects their preferences for a residential location away from 
airports. This has been reflected in both surveys (Van Praag, 2004) 
and hedonic price models of property values (Nelson, 2004). Second, 
airports host a set of airline companies that offer air connections 
between city pairs with various profitability levels. Some city pair 
connections are highly profitable while others are less. In equilibrium, 
the least profitable air connection will naturally have (almost) zero 
Figure 1: Feasible routes from an airport.
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Figure 2: Actual and proposed routes from Brussels airport.
Figure 3: Distribution of noise disutility on route r and design of zones.
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profit. Third, airports operate aircraft movements on one or several 
runways, and each runway can be associated with several aircraft 
routes. Air traffic is organized along several routes that airplanes may 
take when they land and take off. Landing and take-off routes are 
determined by exogenous technical characteristic, for instance by the 
direction of wind. Yet, within the same set of technical parameters there 
exist several route possibilities. An aircraft route includes the path, the 
altitude and the engine power taken by an aircraft for takeoff or landing. 
As shown in Figure 1, a West-runway may for example direct the planes 
to a South-West, West or North-West route some miles after takeoff. 
Figure 2 displays no less than six actual routes and three additional 
proposed routes from the South-West runway of Brussels airport.
For expositional purposes, we make the three following simplifying 
assumptions in this paper4. First, we assume that only one type of 
aircraft operates in the airport, so that the residents have the same 
noise disutility for every aircraft flight. Second, to emphasize spatial 
design issues we suppose that residents are homogenous with respect 
to their disutility for noise pollution, but that they differ according to 
their distance  from the airport. Finally, there is only one relevant time 
period, say 8:00-20:00, during which aircrafts operate.
We focus therefore on the relationship between space and the market 
for noise licenses. Each aircraft gives rise to noise disutility ?(t) to 
each resident living on ground at the distance t from the airport. The 
intensity of the noise disutility varies with the altitude and the engine 
power of each aircraft, which depends on the aircraft position on its 
route. As shown in Figure 3, the total disutility hence depends on this 
noise intensity and the number of residents harmed by the noise, and it 
is different on each point of the aircraft route.
Let us begin with the simple (but probably unrealistic) case of a single 
route (Figure 2).
A. The case of a single route
It is rather easy to understand how markets for noise licenses work 
when there exists only a single route. In this case, a noise license is 
defined as the right for one aircraft to fly over the route and to emit 
noise. This right is given to the residents, who are represented by a single 
4. Those assumptions are relaxed and discussed in Bréchet and Picard (2010, 2011).
L’ANALYSE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET APPLICATION À DES PROBLÉMATIQUES RÉGIONALES
82
AIRPORT NOISE POLLUTION
83
representative acting on their behalf. As a consequence, noise licenses 
must be purchased by each aircraft flying over the route. The demand 
for noise licenses is given by the profitability of city pair connections. 
If each city pair connection x makes a profit π(x), and if the price of 
the noise license to flight the route is denoted by P, then the demand 
for noise license is equal to yD(P), the number of city pair connections 
that make a profit at a noise license price P. At a positive noise license 
price, the lowest profitable connection is no longer viable and must 
close. In Figure 3, this is shown by the curve yD(P) Mathematically, it 
is defined as yD(P) =#{x: π(x)-P}. On the other hand, noise licenses are 
granted by the representative of the residents under the unique route. 
This representative organizes the compensation for aircraft noise. If 
she is utilitarian, she will consider the aggregate disutility over the 
route, d(y), which depends on the number of flights and on a measure 
of aggregate disutility B. That is, she sums the numbers n(t) of residents 
at every distance t from the airport on the route with the intensity of the 
noise disutility that is perceived by the residents at distance t, δ(t). This 
yields :
Note that the parameter δ(t) measures the resident’s noise subjective 
perception, i.e. their disutility. It is not a technical measure of noise 
exposure, such as the dBA index. The key of noise license markets is to 
allow residents to reveal their true disutility. 
The resident’s representative is allowed to issue noise licenses and 
to sell them to the aircrafts that fly over her route. She is willing to 
issue and sell noise licenses. Her supply curve for noise licenses will 
be upward sloping. Under the assumption that the noise of the first 
flight during the time period implies no noise disutility, this supply 
curve will have a zero intercept. This is shown by the curve yS(P) in 
Figure 4. When there exists only one route and many independent 
airline companies, the representative will exert monopsony power and 
set the number of noise licenses that maximizes the aggregate utility 
of the residents located under the route. That is, she will supply noise 
licenses until her aggregate marginal disutility from noise exceeds 
her marginal revenue from noise licenses. Her revenue is thus equal 
to PyS(P). Any additional license brings her a marginal revenue equal 
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to PyS(P)’, which is represented in Figure 4 by a curve higher than the 
price under her supply curve yS(P). The marginal revenue rises faster 
than the price determined by the supply curve because every additional 
noise license must compensate for a higher noise damage, which makes 
this license and all the other ones more expensive. Then, the equilibrium 
is given by the equality between marginal revenues and demand: 
(PyS(P))’= yD(P). As a result, the residents located below the route 
constrain the number of flights to yM. Because the number of flights 
is equal to yo > yM in the absence of noise licenses, the requirement to 
purchase noise licenses from residents reduces the airport activity by 
eliminating the least profitable flights.
As in any market, a rise in the supply curve must raise the equilibrium 
price and reduce the activity level. The difference with a usual market is 
that residents here collect a share of the airline activity rents in addition 
to the strict compensation for their noise disutility. Residents are 
represented by a representative that has monopsony power. The latter 
collect more than what would be necessary to accept the noise related 
to the flight activity. Nevertheless, residents do not cancel the airport 
activity (as it is sometimes feared by airport advocates). Indeed, airline 
companies face a situation similar to the one the manufacturing firms 
face with union monopsonies: the latter constrains the firms’ activities 
and profits but do not call for their shutdown. It is probably interesting 
to push the present analysis a bit further. For instance, defendants of 
airport economic activity sometimes claim that the impact of noise 
pollution is much less than what residents’ associations state. Under 
this claim, both the supply and marginal revenue curves should have 
relatively flat slopes. As a consequence, the introduction of a market for 
noise licenses should imply a quite low price for noise license, which 
would be of no threat for the airport activity.
The main point of this exercise is to show that noise licenses allow 
residents to reveal their preferences about their noise disutility below 
the route and allow airline companies to reveal their willingness to pay 
to operate from the airport. This is typically what Coase (1960) would 
advocate: to give property rights over noise either to local victims (the 
residents) or to polluters (the aircraft companies). Since the residents are 
victims of aircraft noise pollution, this naturally implies that property 
rights on noise (or quietness) are granted to those residents. They are 
then free to transfer those rights to aircraft companies by the means of 
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noise licenses. Hence, the regulator does not need to arbitrage between 
residents and airline companies for the noise externality.
What would be the size of this rent to residents in practice? That depends 
on the shapes and elasticities of supply and demand curves, and on the 
equilibrium reached once the noise license market is implemented. For 
a linear supply curve (as shown in Figure 4), the price under marginal 
revenue is known to be double of the price under the supply curve. So, if 
we set the airport traffic level to the one existing without noise licenses, 
the noise damage cost per 100-seat aircraft asked by residents would 
be evaluated at about 55 Euros for the Brussels’ airport according to 
Bréchet et al.’s (2009) study. That would be what the residents should 
receive to make the aircraft noise acceptable. However, the monopsony 
power of residents would yield an additional rent of the same amount. 
At this traffic level, the price for a noise license of a 100-seat aircraft 
would amount to the double of the above cost to 55 Euros; that is, 
110 Euros. This amount is unlikely to alter the airlines’ decision to 
operate their city-pair connections. By contrast, in Schipper (2004), the 
environmental cost is evaluated at about 2,000 Euros, so that the total 
Figure 4:  Market equilibrium with monopsony route
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price at the current traffic level would be 4,000 Euros, which is high. 
The point of a market for noise licenses is to entice residents and firms 
reveal the price that will reflect their marginal damage and loss.
The rent to residents has an impact on aircraft movements and noise 
market prices. Indeed, higher rents will cause higher noise license 
prices, which will entice airlines to consider shutting down the non-
profitable connections. To assess this, we must again stress that the 
answer does depend on the shapes and elasticities of supply and demand 
functions. We know that passenger demands have elasticities roughly 
around one (see Gillen et al. 2007). This means that a 10% increase 
in ticket price diminishes travel demand by 10%. For the sake of the 
exercise, we may consider that, in addition to the above assumption 
of linear supply, the demand for noise licenses has a unitary elasticity 
(a heroic assumption). In this case, one can show that the presence of 
monopsony rent decreases aircraft movements and increases the price 
by the factor 
In such an example, the residents’ monopsony power would have a 
significant impact on the price of noise licenses and on the airport 
activity. The design of the noise license market must therefore reduce 
this market power of residents on a specific route by introducing 
additional routes, which we explain now.
B. The case of several routes
Suppose now that air traffic controllers can direct flights over 
several routes. In this (more realistic) case, a noise license is defined 
as the right for one aircraft to fly and emit noise over a specific route. 
So there are as many types of noise licenses as there are routes. As the 
reader will understand, the main feature of a market for noise licenses 
is now its spatial dimension. Residents are distributed over the space 
under aircraft routes and airline companies are required to buy the 
licenses to take a route. In addition, each route is associated with an 
independent representative who is responsible to issue noise licenses 
in exchange for a monetary compensation. The competition between 
representatives is meant to reduce the monopsony rents described 
above.  Each representative i infers her supply of noise licenses y
i
S(P) 
from the aggregate noise disutility of the residents dwelling under her 
route. The representative is in charge of redistributing the compensation 
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and the possible rent to each individual according to the local noise 
conditions.
From the air controllers’ viewpoint, routes are generally good 
substitutes. For instance, under good weather conditions, routing an 
aircraft to West or North-West routes a couple of miles after takeoff 
does not present technical and safety challenges. Figure 2 offers a good 
example of a handful of routes from Brussels airport. Because routes are 
substitutes, aircraft are enticed to choose the routes offering the noise 
licenses with the lowest price. In equilibrium, the noise license prices of 
all routes must equalize and the equilibrium number of flights, yR(P), is 
given by the aggregation of each route’s supply, yS(P)=Σ
i
 y
i
S(P) and the 
total demand for noise licenses, yD(P). This is shown in Figure 5.
As above, the residents’ possibility to sell noise licenses entices them 
to reveal their disutility. The intervention of the regulator is not needed 
after the setup of a noise license market. In addition, dividing the space 
surrounding the airport into several routes has two important properties. 
First, it permits the noise disutility to be spread over more individuals. 
When individuals are increasingly harmed by additional noise events, 
Figure 5: Market equilibrium with two routes
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they are less hurt by an aircraft noise event at low traffic levels than at 
high levels. As a consequence, it is more efficient to rebalance flight 
activity from routes with high flight activity to ones with low activity. 
The market for noise licenses achieves this dispersion property. Second, 
by setting up several routes, the routes’ representatives lose market 
power over aircraft and get lower rents. Formally, the importance of 
the rent reduction depends on the number of routes that can be opened 
to aircraft movements. Hence with a large enough number of routes the 
above rents can be significantly reduced. 
The existence of rents is no surprise. Rents are features of any markets 
with heterogeneous buyers and sellers. The market is here used to 
reveal the preferences of both residents and airline companies about the 
aircraft noise emissions. 
The use of markets for pollution licenses to regulate pollution is typical 
in the environmental economics literature. Montgomery (1972) indeed 
inspired the use of tradeable permits or licenses as policy instruments 
for environmental issues. Since the 1990s, many examples of markets 
for tradable permits have been successfully implemented, most notably 
for sulfur dioxide pollution in the US power industry (Ellerman et al., 
2000) and for carbon dioxide in the European Union (see Ellerman et 
al., 2010). All these markets, nevertheless, are cap-and-trade systems 
in the sense where the global supply of pollution licenses is set by the 
regulator (this is the cap on pollution), and polluters are then allowed 
to trade these permits among themselves. In our setting, the supply 
of licenses is endogenous, and it is based on residents’ preferences. 
By contrast to cap-and-trade systems, our market allows to reveal 
preferences on both sides of the market5.
C. Several zones, with one route
We finally consider the last case where aircrafts must follow a 
unique route, but where this route is divided into several contiguous 
zones. A zone is defined as a land strip below a route where residents 
are represented by a single representative. There may be many 
zones and representatives below the same route. Those zones can be 
municipalities, districts, communities or residents’ associations. Figure 
6 depicts a case where the route is divided into two zones. A noise 
license is thus defined as the right for one aircraft to fly over one zone 
5. See Ellerman (2005) for a broad introduction to markets for tradeable pollution permits.
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and to emit noise in that zone. So, to fly the entire route an aircraft 
ought to purchase a noise license for every zone. On the route, the 
licenses supplied by different zones’ representatives are thus perfect 
complements for airline companies. Noise pollution is therefore a 
complementary bad for all zones on a single route. 
Typically, this may lead to a tragedy of the anti-commons where the 
agents do not internalize the global effect of their decisions on the route 
traffic. The usual tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) explains why 
people overuse shared resources: it happens when too many owners 
can have a privilege to use a given resource, and no one has a right 
to exclude another. The tragedy of the anti-commons (Heller and 
Eisengerg, 1998) happens when a resource is prone to underutilization 
because too many owners can block each others, and no one has an 
effective privilege of use. In our context, each residents’ representative 
owns the right to issue noise licenses and does not internalize the 
benefits that other zones bear. One may conjecture that the number of 
licenses and flights is inefficient. Another way to see this is to observe 
that noise licenses offered by the different zones are complementary 
Figure. 6: Market equilibrium with two zones
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goods. Therefore the market for noise licenses may be suspected to 
be subject to under-provision of complementary goods. Independent 
suppliers of complementary goods would set inefficiently low output 
levels because they would not internalize the effect of the benefit of a 
larger supply of their goods on the other suppliers. Bréchet and Picard 
(2010) show that those effects do exist, but that they can nevertheless be 
under the control of the market designer. In sum, the market itself does 
not work properly but it can be adequately designed by the regulator to 
match the socially optimal situation.
Bréchet and Picard (2010) propose to organize the market with a 
neutral auctioneer who collects the noise license price bids supplied 
by the zone representatives and who sell to each aircraft the bundles 
of noise licenses on all zones at a price equal to maximum bid price 
times the number of zones. This means that the zone offering the bid 
with the highest noise license price (which is also the one that bears the 
highest noise damage) receives exactly what it bids. This zone is called 
the critical zone because it determines the price to fly over the whole 
route. The other zones receive more than what they bid. Such a situation 
corresponds to a standard market equilibrium where the marginal 
transaction gives no rent to the marginal supplier, but a positive rent to 
the infra-marginal suppliers. 
In this context, the equilibrium in the noise license market can be 
represented as in Figure 6 (for two zones). Let d
i
(y
i
) be the aggregate 
noise disutility over the zone i for a traffic level y
i
 over the zone i. This 
is the disutility that zone i’s representative considers in deciding its 
price bid for a noise license. The bid price of a zone i’s representative 
is then determined by her marginal disutility d
i
’(y
i
). The market 
auctioneer picks the largest bid price (max
i
 d
i
’(y
i
)) and sets the price of 
the route PZ=2max
i
 d
i
’(y
i
). The resulting number of flights is then given 
by the aircraft demand to fly on the route yZ = yD(PZ ). The zone j with 
the lowest marginal disutility gets a rent. In Figure 6, this rent is given 
to zone 2 and equal to d
1
’(yZ ) - d
2
’(yZ).
The key point here is to consider that the market designer is able to 
tune the level of this rent by altering zones’ spatial design. Indeed, if 
she reduces the size of the critical zone, aircraft noise will affect fewer 
residents in this zone. It will therefore reduce the aggregate disutility 
and the marginal disutility over this zone, which in turn will reduce the 
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critical zone’s bid price, and therefore the rents given to other zones. 
The important point is that the tragedy of the anti-commons can be 
neutralized in this setup by an appropriate design of the zones.
IV. Conclusion
Noise pollution is a sensitive issue for all major airports. Many 
airport authorities try to manage this problem using aircraft noise 
limitation, aircraft movement procedures and land planning. They do 
not use instruments that make airline activities internalize the noise 
disutility of the residents located below the takeoff and landing routes, 
and it is also easy to understand that a fee on noise would not solve 
the distribution of aircraft movements across the available routes. By 
contrast, in this paper we explain how to implement local markets for 
noise licenses as a way to allow both airlines internalize their harm 
on residents and residents reveal their disutility due to noise pollution. 
In such a market the supply of noise licenses is made by residents 
who are organized in geographical zones under the aircraft routes 
(e.g. municipalities, districts, communities, associations) and who 
are allowed to emit and sell noise licenses to airline companies. In 
equilibrium of the market for tradeable noise licenses, the price of noise 
licenses will reflect both the marginal noise disutility of residents and 
the smallest profit made by the aircrafts moving in and out the airport. 
An adequate design of the market (by defining the zones) implements 
the socially optimal situation.
The combination of noise licenses given to residents with an appropriate 
spatial design of aircraft activity around airports is thus an appealing 
solution for the management of noise pollution around airports. The 
market for noise licenses yields an efficient allocation of flights across 
routes, a solution that airport charges on aircraft movements could 
not achieve. By increasing the number of routes the market designer 
can spread the noise disutility where it has the lowest social cost and 
she can reduce the residents’ rents in eliciting their information about 
noise disutility. By creating appropriate zones the market designer can 
delegate the revelation of noise disutility to smaller spatial groups of 
residents and limit the problem of the tragedy of anti-commons.
At this stage of the discussion, we acknowledge that, because of its 
novelty, the present economic theory of noise licenses may let the 
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stakeholders involved in airport noise management issues rather 
dubious. However the economic instruments that allow polluting 
parties to internalize the harm on the victims are shown to have superior 
efficiency properties. Noise license markets are such instruments. To 
our opinion, they deserve a dedicated attention by policy makers as well 
as further research in the field of air transport management.
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